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CLOSING DIRECT APPEAL TO INEFFECTIVENESS
CLAIMS: THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA'S
DENIAL OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Thomas M. Place*
"[F]aimess and the appearance of fairness . . are
essential to the administration of criminal justice."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Although there is no federal constitutional right to appeal a
criminal conviction, Pennsylvania, like a number of jurisdictions,
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania
State University. A special thanks to Grace D'Alo for her thoughtful comments
on earlier drafts of this article and to Patrick Boyer and Andrew Kroekel for
their research assistance.
Commonwealth v. Wharton, 435 A.2d 158, 166 (Pa. 1981) (Roberts, J.,
opinion in support of affirmance).
2 See, e.g., Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 118-19 (1995) (per curiam)
(discrediting argument that there should be a constitutional right to appeal);
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) ("There is, of course, no
constitutional right to appeal . . . ."); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611 (1974)
("[lit is clear that the State need not provide any appeal at all."); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (acknowledging "that a State is not required by
the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts" but noting that "[a]ll of the
States now provide some method of appeal from criminal convictions");
McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) (holding that the right to appeal
in a criminal case is not "a necessary element of due process of law"). But see
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 756-57 n.1 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(questioning whether the Court would reaffirm prior holding that there is no
constitutional right to appeal but noting "a case presenting this question is
unlikely to arise . . . [because] a right of appeal is now universal for all
significant criminal convictions"). For a discussion of the right to appeal, see
David Rossman, "Were There No Appeal": The History of Review in American
Criminal Courts, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 518, 519-20 (1990). See also
Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39
UCLA L. REV. 503, 503 (1992) (asserting that criminal appeals did not exist at
the time of the nation's founding); Daniel Givelber, The Right to Counsel in
Collateral, Post-Conviction Proceedings, 58 MD. L. REV. 1393, 1396 n.22
(1999) (noting that the Supreme Court of the United States has never
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guarantees a first appeal as of right by state constitutional
provision.3 The Pennsylvania Constitution also guarantees citizens
the right to due process 4 and equal treatment. 5 Notwithstanding
these guarantees, in Commonwealth v. Grant,6 the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania adopted a rule of procedure that leaves defendants
who have been sentenced to a short period of imprisonment,
probation, or parole without a procedure to assert the
ineffectiveness of the lawyer that represented them at trial.7 In
Grant, the court decided to no longer permit consideration of
claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness on appeal.8 Instead, the court
deferred such claims to the post-conviction process governed by
the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). 9
The PCRA establishes a unified statutory procedure for
defendants to collaterally challenge their conviction or sentence.' 0
The Act is the "sole means" of review for claims that were
traditionally reviewable by habeas corpus or coram nobis including
claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel." An important limitation
on the availability of relief under the PCRA is the requirement that
the defendant be serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation, or
encountered a case where the state did not provide appellate review of a criminal
case).
3 PA. CONST. art. V, § 9. Ten other states guarantee the right to appeal by
constitution, and thirty-five states, plus the District of Columbia provide for
appeal as of right by statute. See Rosanna Cavallaro, Better Off Dead.
Abatement, Innocence, and the Evolving Right of Appeal, 73 U. COLO L. REV.
943, 946-47 n. 12 (2002) (compiling appeal provisions in every jurisdiction); see
also Bundy v. Wilson, 815 F.2d 125, app. at 136-42 (1st Cir. 1987). In New
Hampshire, Virginia, and West Virginia, there is discretionary appellate review
but no appeal as of right. See N.H. R. S. CT. 7(1) (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-
405 (West 2003); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-5-1 (LexisNexis 2005).
4 PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
5 PA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
6 Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002).
7 Id. at 738.
8Id.
9 Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9541-9546 (2011).
'
0 Id. § 9542.
11 Id.
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parole "at the time relief is granted."1 2 In addition, the Act does not
authorize a stay of sentence while relief is being sought.13
Following Grant, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
(Superior Court) recognized that defendants who receive a
sentence of short duration would not be eligible for post-conviction
review because their sentences would be served before post-
conviction review was completed. 14 Consequently, the court
created a short-sentence exception to Grant which permitted
claims of ineffectiveness to be considered on direct appeal. 15 In
Commonwealth v. O'Berg,16 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
rejected the short-sentence exception, holding that it would
undermine the reasons for deferring ineffectiveness claims to the
post-conviction process. 17
As the result of O'Berg, unless the issue of trial counsel's
ineffectiveness is preserved for appeal by new counsel in a post-
sentence motion, 18 defendants who fully serve their sentence while
direct appeal is pending 9 or before the post-conviction process is
12 Id.
13 Commonwealth v. Salisbury, 823 A.2d 914, 916 n.1 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2003), overruled by Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597 (Pa. 2005).
14Id. at 916.
15 Commonwealth v. Blessitt, 852 A.2d 1215, 1220 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004),
disapproved of by Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 880 A.2d 592 (Pa. 2005);
Commonwealth v. Ingold, 823 A.2d 917, 919 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), disapproved
of by Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 880 A.2d 592 (Pa. 2005); Salisbury, 823 A.2d
at 916.
16 Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597 (Pa. 2005).
7 Id. at 601-02.
18 PA. R. CRIM. P. 720(B). In several post-Grant decisions, Chief Justice
Castille has questioned the use of post-trial motions as a means of litigating
ineffectiveness claims by noting that such motions "subvert the PCRA." O'Berg,
880 A.2d at 605 (Castille, J., concurring); see also Commonwealth v. Liston,
977 A.2d 1089, 1099 (Pa. 2009) (Castille, C.J., concurring); Commonwealth v.
Rega, 933 A.2d 997, 1032 (Pa. 2007) (Castille, J., concurring).
19 Of the sentences imposed in 2009, 14,491 or 17.43% of all sentences
imposed were for sentences of less than one year of either imprisonment
combined with probation, or sentences of county intermediate punishment; and
sentences of less than two years of prison and probation account for over a third
of all sentences imposed. E-mail from Joan F. Lisle, Information Access
Manager, Pa. Commission on Sentencing, to Thomas M. Place, Professor of
Law, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law (Feb. 22, 2011, 3:20 PM)
(on file with author). Direct appeal frequently takes more than a year or more to
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completed 20 are denied both direct appeal and post-conviction
review and, as a result, do not have a remedy to "vindicate their
right to effective trial counsel."', 1 This article22 argues that the
Grant rule of deferral unconstitutionally denies defendants with
short sentences their rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution to
direct appeal, 23 due process, 24 and equal protection of the laws.
25
Part I of the article discusses the Grant decision and the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania's rejection of the Superior Court's short-
sentence exception to Grant. Part II examines the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania's rulemaking authority under article V, section 10
complete and in some cases several years. See O'Berg, 880 A.2d at 602 (noting
"instances where ... direct appeal took more than four years to be completed").
The median number of days for appeals to be disposed of by the Superior Court
by a filed decision in 2009 was 356. See Superior Court of Pennsylvania Annual
Report 2009, THE UNIFIED JUD. SYS. OF PA., 10, http://www.pacourts.us/assets/
files/setting-790/file-755.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
20 A study published in 2003 found that the median time statewide for a
non-capital PCRA petition to be decided by the trial court was in excess of ten
months. Donald J. Harris, Kim Nieves & Thomas M. Place, Dispatch & Delay:
Post Conviction Relief Act Litigation in Non-Capital Cases, 41 DUQ. L. REV.
467, 488 (2003). The study noted that it was "not unusual to find PCRA
cases ... pending for two, three, or even four years." Id. at 492.
21 Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 378 (1986). The Supreme Court
of the United States has long recognized "the right to counsel is the right to
effective assistance of counsel." Id. at 377; see also Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942) (holding that the right to counsel was violated when
judicial action denied defendant's "right to have the effective assistance of
counsel"). The right to effective counsel is rooted in the essential role that
counsel plays in assuring that the rights of the defendant are protected. See
United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 31-32 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 71 (1932). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recognized that "the
right to counsel is meaningless if effective assistance is not guaranteed."
Commonwealth v. Albert, 561 A.2d 736, 738 (Pa. 1989).
22 An earlier article proposed statutory and rule changes that would permit
defendants with short sentences review of ineffectiveness claims on direct
appeal or by collateral review. See Thomas M. Place, Ineffectiveness of Counsel
and Short-Term Sentences in Pennsylvania: A Claim in Search of a Remedy, 17
TEMPLE POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 109, 122,125 (2007).23 PA. CONST. art. V, § 9.
24 PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
25 PA. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 26.
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of the Pennsylvania Constitution.26 The article then discusses the
right to appeal and argues that the Grant rule unreasonably restricts
the right of defendants with short sentences to appellate review of
claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness. In Part III, the article argues
that, by closing direct appeal to ineffectiveness claims when
defendants with short sentences are unable to present the issue in a
collateral proceeding, Grant violates the rights to due process and
equal protection of the law. Lastly, the article considers the use of
coram nobis to challenge the ineffectiveness of trial counsel and
proposes a judicial solution to restore the right to direct appeal to
defendants with sentences of short duration.
A. The Grant Decision and the Rejection of the Short-Sentence
Exception
Prior to Grant, a defendant was required to raise a claim of
ineffectiveness of trial counsel 27 "at the earliest stage in the
proceedings at which the counsel whose effectiveness is being
challenged no longer represents the defendant," even if that stage
was direct appeal.2 8 If the claim was not raised, it was deemed
26 PA. CONST. art. V, § 10.
27 "[T]he right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel."
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986); see also Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (stating that the fact "[t]hat a person who
happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused ... is not enough
to satisfy" the Sixth Amendment); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771
(1970) ("[I]f the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its
purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel . ").
The right to effective counsel applies without regard to the length of the
sentence of imprisonment imposed or whether counsel is retained or appointed
by the court. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1980) ("[W]e see no
basis for drawing a distinction between retained and appointed counsel that
would deny equal justice to defendants who must choose their own lawyers.");
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33 (1972) (holding that counsel must be
appointed in any criminal prosecution "that actually leads to imprisonment even
for a brief period").
28 Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 372 A.2d 687, 695 n.6 (Pa. 1977),
overruled by Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002). The Hubbard
rule was based on Commonwealth v. Dancer. Commonwealth v. Dancer, 331
A.2d 435 (Pa. 1975). In Dancer, defendant had employed new counsel to appeal
his conviction but had not included in the appeal claims of ineffectiveness of
trial counsel. Id. at 436. He subsequently sought post-conviction relief
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waived. 29 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania strictly applied the
waiver rule. 30 If ineffectiveness of trial counsel was not raised on
direct appeal by new counsel, post-conviction relief was denied,
unless post-conviction counsel proved a "layered" claim of
ineffectiveness, namely, that appellate counsel was ineffective in
failing to present the ineffectiveness of prior counsel.31
challenging the effectiveness of trial counsel. Id. The post-conviction petition
did not allege the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. Id. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief on grounds that the
claims of trial counsel's ineffectiveness were waived when new counsel had
failed to raise the claims on direct appeal. Id. at 438. The court noted that claims
of ineffectiveness could be raised in a collateral proceeding only when (1) trial
counsel represented the defendant on direct appeal, for it was "unrealistic to
expect trial counsel on direct appeal to argue his own ineffectiveness;" (2) new
counsel represents the defendant on appeal but the basis for the ineffectiveness
claims are not of record; (3) the defendant establishes other "extraordinary
circumstances" justifying the failure to present the issue on appeal; and (4) the
defendant rebuts the presumption of "knowing and understanding failure" to
present the issue on direct appeal. Id.
29 Hubbard, 372 A.2d at 695 n.6. The defendant in Hubbard was
represented by new counsel at both the post-trial motion stage and on direct
appeal. Id. at 695. Direct appeal counsel alleged the ineffectiveness of trial
counsel and the ineffectiveness of post-trial motion counsel for failing to raise
the ineffectiveness of trial counsel. Id. The court held that the claims of trial
counsel's ineffectiveness were waived because post-trial motion counsel had
failed to present the claims to the trial court. Id. at 696. Nonetheless, trial
counsel's performance was reviewed by the court through the lens of post-trial
motion counsel's failure to preserve the claims of the ineffectiveness of trial
counsel. Id. The court limited its analysis of the abandoned claims of trial
counsel's ineffectiveness to determine whether there was arguable merit to the
claims not pursued, and, if so, the basis for post-trial counsel's decision not to
raise the claims. Id. The court noted that, if the ineffectiveness of trial counsel
was record based, the appellant would be entitled to file a post-trial motion nunc
pro tunc in the trial court. Id. at 696. A remand would be required, on the other
hand, if the record did not disclose a satisfactory basis for post-trial counsel's
omission. Id.
30 Id. at 695 n.6.
31 Commonwealth v. McGill, 832 A.2d 1014, 1022 (Pa. 2003). In McGill,
the court held when direct appeal did not include claims of ineffectiveness of
trial counsel, the only viable claim in a post-conviction proceeding was the
ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. Id. at 1021. To obtain relief in such a case,
the defendant seeking post-conviction relief was required to establish the
ineffectiveness of trial counsel under the standard set forth in Commonwealth v.
Pierce, 786 A.2d 203 (Pa. 2001). Id. at 1022. Next, the defendant was required
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In Commonwealth v. Grant, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania overruled the long-standing waiver rule, holding that
it was at odds with well-established rules that appellate courts do
not act as fact finders or consider matters outside the record.32 The
court noted that the rule was the "exact opposite" of the appellate
process followed in other cases and inconsistent with most states
and the majority of federal circuits that require ineffectiveness
claims to be raised in a post-conviction proceeding.33 The court
explained that other jurisdictions defer ineffectiveness claims to
collateral review because the record is rarely sufficiently
developed to permit the appellate court to rule on the issue and that
such claims will almost always require consideration of facts not of
record.34 Moreover, as other courts have recognized, the trial court
is best equipped to make findings about counsel's performance and
the impact of counsel's acts or omissions.35 Finally, the court noted
it was not clear that appellate counsel had the responsibility to
discover and present to the appellate court extra-record claims
relating to trial counsel's performance.36  These rationales
to establish that appellate counsel did not have a reasonable basis for failing to
raise the ineffectiveness of trial counsel. Id. Lastly, the defendant had to prove
that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the appeal would
have been different had appellate counsel presented the claim of trial counsel
ineffectiveness. Id. at 1023.
32 Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 734 (Pa. 2002). Grant was
represented on direct appeal by new counsel. Id. at 729. After the Superior Court
dismissed two of Grant's claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness for failure to
adequately develop the claims, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted
limited allowance of appeal and directed the parties to address whether the court
should reconsider the waiver rule. Id. Grant argued in the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania that the Superior Court's dismissal of his ineffectiveness claims
was erroneous because appellate rules did not permit an appellant to supplement
the record on appeal to support his claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness. Id.
Grant claimed that the Superior Court should have remanded the claims to the
trial court instead of dismissing them. Id. Neither Grant nor the Commonwealth
asked the court to set aside the waiver rule. See id.
33 The court in Grant noted that some jurisdictions that defer
ineffectiveness claims to the collateral process permit such claims to be
reviewed on direct appeal if the existing record is adequate to decide the claims.
Grant, 813 A.2d at 734-35.
3 4 
ld. at 737.
15 Id. at 736.36 Id. (citing Woods v. Indiana, 701 N.E.2d 1208, 1221-22 (Ind. 1998)).
WIDENER LAW JOURNAL
persuaded the court that "[d]eferring review of trial counsel
ineffectiveness claims until the collateral review stage of the
proceedings offers a petitioner the best avenue to effect his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. 3 7 Grant holds that claims of trial
counsel ineffectiveness are not waived because new counsel does
not present the claims on direct appeal.38 Instead, as a general
rule, 9 claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel will not be
considered on direct appeal, but deferred to the post-conviction
process.40 The court reached this conclusion notwithstanding the
37 Id. at 738. For many indigent defendants, closing direct appeal to
ineffectiveness claims does not provide the "best avenue to effect" their
constitutional right to effective counsel because unlike direct appeal, which
simply requires the defendant to communicate to trial counsel his desire to
appeal, under the PCRA an indigent defendant must file a timely pro se petition
for relief and, as noted, the petition must be filed while the defendant is in
custody. Id. In contrast to direct appeal, the pro se petition must be filed before
the court is authorized to appoint counsel. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9545(b)
(2011) (displaying that the petition must be filed before any further action is
taken on the issue). A defendant's failure to file a timely petition will result in
waiver of the ineffectiveness claims. Id. § 9544(b). Post-conviction claims have
been waived as the result of an untimely petition because defendant's housing
status in prison limited his access to legal materials. Commonwealth v. Barrett,
761 A.2d 145, 148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). Claims have also been waived where
the defendant, because of mental illness, was unable to file a timely petition and
thereby trigger the appointment of counsel. See Commonwealth v. Hoffman,
780 A.2d 700, 704 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) ("[W]e hold that Appellant's petition
was properly dismissed as untimely under the PCRA statute and his claim of
continuing mental illness does not constitute an exception to its jurisdictional
time requirements.").
38 Grant, 813 A.2d at 738.
39 The court noted that the general rule of deferral might not apply when
the ineffectiveness claim involves "a complete or constructive denial of
counsel," or when counsel breaches "his or her duty of loyalty" to the defendant.
Id. at 738 n.14.
40 Id. at 738. Post-Grant, the Supreme Court of the United States in
Massaro v. United States held in federal criminal cases claims of trial counsel
ineffectiveness can be presented in a collateral proceeding "whether or not the
petitioner could have raised the claim on direct appeal." Massaro v. United
States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). While the Court acknowledged that a
collateral proceeding is "preferable to direct appeal" as the trial court is the best
forum for resolving ineffectiveness claims, the Court, in contrast to Grant,
refused to adopt a strict rule of deferral, noting that there may be cases in which
the ineffectiveness claim can be resolved on direct appeal. Id at 504, 508; see
also Grant, 813 A.2d at 740 (Saylor, J., concurring) (arguing that the new rule in
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language in the PCRA that the Act was "not intended to limit the
availability of remedies on direct appeal from the judgment of
sentence. ,
41
In a number of Superior Court cases decided a year after
Grant, the court recognized a "short sentence, 42 exception to the
Grant rule. The exception was originally set out in Commonwealth
v. Salisbury43 in which the defendant was sentenced to ninety days
imprisonment, but the court stayed the sentence pending appeal.
44
On appeal, the defendant alleged the ineffectiveness of trial
counsel.45 Instead of deferring the claim to the post-conviction
process, the Superior Court reviewed the ineffectiveness claim,
relying upon language in Grant that the deferral rule did not apply
if it would result in harm to one of the parties to the appeal.46 The
court concluded that Salisbury would not be eligible for post-
conviction review of his ineffectiveness claim under Grant because
he would serve his short sentence before collateral review would
be completed.47 In light of Salisbury's sentence, the court stated
that "review delayed constitutes review denied.
4 8
Grant should not apply when a claim of ineffectiveness has been developed in
the trial court by post-sentence motion). But see Commonwealth v. Liston, 977
A.2d 1089, 1096 (Pa. 2009) (Castille, C.J., concurring) (warning lower courts
not to take affirmative steps to accommodate review of ineffectiveness claims
by way of post-sentence motions).
41 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9542 (2011).
42 Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597, 598 (Pa. 2005).
43 Commonwealth v. Salisbury, 823 A.2d 914 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003),
overruled by Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597 (Pa. 2005).
44Id. at 915-16 n.1.45 1d at 915.
46 Id. at 916. The reference to harm in Grant was in the context of the
court's decision to apply the new rule retroactively to cases pending on direct
appeal where the issue of ineffectiveness had been raised and preserved. Grant,
813 A.2d at 738. The Grant court was persuaded that retroactive application of
the new rule would harm neither party because claims of ineffectiveness can be
raised in a post-conviction proceeding. Salisbury, 823 A.2d at 916 (quoting
Grant, 813 A.2d at 739).
47 Salisbury, 823 A.2d at 916.
48 Id at 916 n.i. The Superior Court also applied the short-sentence
exception in Commonwealth v. Ingold, 823 A.2d 917, 919 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003)
(sentenced to seven days time-served), overruled by Commonwealth v. O'Berg,
880 A.2d 597 (Pa. 2005); Commonwealth v. Viglione, 842 A.2d 454, 457 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2004) (sentenced to pay a fine), overruled by Commonwealth v.
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The short-sentence exception to Grant was rejected by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. O'Berg.
49
O'Berg was convicted of two misdemeanors and a summary
offense and sentenced to thirty days to twenty-three-and-a-half
months in prison. 50 While the trial court permitted O'Berg to
remain on bail pending the resolution of his appeal, O'Berg elected
to begin serving his sentence while his case was pending on direct
appeal.5 1
O'Berg's appeal challenged both the sufficiency of the
evidence and the counsel's effectiveness at trial.5 2 After O'Berg's
brief was filed in the Superior Court, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania issued its opinion in Grant.53 While the Superior
Court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the
convictions, it concluded that the ineffectiveness claim was
governed by the newly announced Grant rule and dismissed the
claim without prejudice, allowing O'Berg to raise the issue in a
post-conviction proceeding. 54 Having already completed his
sentence, O'Berg sought review in the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. 55 O'Berg argued for an exception to Grant for
O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597 (Pa. 2005); Commonwealth v. Dent, 837 A.2d 571, 588
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (sentenced to immediate term of probation concurrent with
sentence on unrelated offense and term had expired), overruled by
Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597 (Pa. 2005); Commonwealth v. Duda,
831 A.2d 728, 733 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (sentenced to ninety days), overruled
by Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597 (Pa. 2005). The Superior Court
distinguished Salisbury and Ingold in Commonwealth v. Millward, 830 A.2d
991, 995 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (holding that the defendant's sentence of ninety
days imprisonment and a concurrent term of three years probation did not
preclude a claim of ineffectiveness from being reviewed in a post-conviction
proceeding). See also Commonwealth v. Blessitt, 852 A.2d 1215, 1220 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2004) (adopting rationale of Salisbury, but finding that because the
defendant was released on bond after being sentenced to sixteen to thirty-two
months incarceration, there was sufficient time within which to seek review of
his ineffectiveness claims under the PCRA).
49 Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597 (Pa. 2005).
0 Id. at 598.51lid.
52 Id.
53 Id. (noting that O'Berg filed his brief in the Supreme Court in October
2002).54 Id. at 599.
55 O'Berg, 880 A.2d at 600.
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defendants with sentences of short duration which would permit
review of ineffectiveness on direct review. 56 O'Berg claimed that
the Superior Court's dismissal of his ineffectiveness claim placed
him "in the unfair position" of being unable to litigate his
ineffectiveness claim on either direct appeal or in a post-conviction
proceeding. 57 Such a result, O'Berg argued, conflicted with the
language in Grant that deferral of ineffectiveness claims to
collateral review offered defendants "the best avenue to affect
[their] Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
5 8
In rejecting the Superior Court's short-sentence exception to
Grant, the court acknowledged the "net effect" of the Grant rule
and the statutory requirement of custody: defendants with short
sentences will "not have the opportunity to raise a claim
challenging trial counsel's effectiveness if their direct appeal is
final at a time when they are no longer serving a sentence of
imprisonment, probation, or parole."5  Nevertheless, the court
noted that there was no trial court record on O'Berg's claim of
ineffectiveness, and if the Grant rule was not applied, the appellate
court would be considering the issue for the first time on appeal.6 °
It was this problem, the court stated, that led to its decision in
Grant to defer ineffectiveness claims to the post-conviction
process. 61 Acknowledging that a defendant should not be harmed
by the Grant rule, the court, nonetheless concluded that the harm
to defendants with short sentences caused by the Grant rule
"cannot be used to defeat" the reasons underlying the deferral
rule. 62 In addition, the court also held that the proposed exception
was "too ambiguous" to give trial courts sufficient guidance as to
when a sentence fell within the exception.
63
56 Id. at 599-600. As noted earlier, prior to Grant, if the issue of
ineffectiveness was raised for the first time on appeal, the appellate court would
remand the matter to the trial court for a hearing and findings concerning the
merits of the issue. See supra notes 28 and 29.
51 O'Berg, 880 A.2d at 599.
58 Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 738 (Pa. 2002)).
59 id.60 Id. at 602.
61 id.
62 Id. at 601.
63 O'Berg, 880 A.2d at 602. In a concurring opinion, now Chief Justice
Castille responded to the Commonwealth's argument that a short-sentence
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In dissent, Justice Saylor noted that in rejecting the short-
sentence exception because of the lack of an evidentiary record in
the trial court, the majority did not take into account the pre-Grant
rule in effect at the time of O'Berg's conviction that allowed for a
remand to the trial court where an ineffectiveness claim was raised
for the first time on appeal.64 Supporting the Superior Court's
"effort to implement fundamental fairness" by allowing a short-
sentence exception to the Grant rule, Justice Saylor noted that the
majority, by refusing to permit the Superior Court to determine
which sentences qualify for the exception, unduly curtails the
"availability of appellate review" and violates the right to direct
appeal guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution.
65
exception was not necessary because, under Commonwealth v. Bomar, 826 A.2d
831 (Pa. 2003), a defendant with a short sentence could obtain review of an
ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal by first filing a post-sentence motion with
the court. O'Berg, 880 A.2d at 603 (Castille, J., concurring). Rejecting such an
approach, Chief Justice Castille noted that ineffectiveness claims are
"quintessentially collateral claims expressly cognizable under the PCRA." Id. at
604. Chief Justice Castille stated that the court should not "subvert the PCRA"
by allowing for "pre-litigation" of ineffectiveness claims by post-sentence
motions in cases where defendants cannot pursue PCRA relief because they are
not in custody. Id.
In light of the now-settled PCRA construct, I do not believe that
this Court is remotely obliged to permit any criminal defendant-no
sentence, short sentence, long sentence, capital sentence-to raise
collateral claims, such as ineffective assistance of counsel, as a matter
of right upon post-trial motions.... The appropriate forum for
litigating claims of ineffectiveness is under the PCRA. That "short
sentence" defendants may not be able to pursue such claims is an
appropriate consequence of a legislative choice .... Ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, as a class, are no more important than
other substantive constitutional claims deemed cognizable under the
PCRA, such that they must be afforded an ad hoc, judicially-created,
extra-PCRA forum.
Id. at 605 (emphasis omitted).
64 Id. at 606 (Saylor, J., dissenting); see Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 372
A.2d 687, 696 (Pa. 1977) (noting that remand would be required if the record
did not disclose a satisfactory basis for post-trial counsel's failure to raise the
ineffectiveness of trial counsel), overruled by Commonwealth v. Grant, 813
A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002).
65 O'Berg, 880 A.2d at 606-07 (Saylor, J., dissenting) (citing PA. CONST.
art. V, § 9).
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II. APPLYING THE GRANT RULE TO DEFENDANTS WITH SHORT
SENTENCES VIOLATES THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION
As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania acknowledged in
O'Berg, the effect of Grant is that defendants with sentences of
short duration have no post-trial opportunity to challenge trial
counsel's ineffectiveness. 66 Because the Grant rule leaves such
defendants without an alternative to direct appeal, the rule
unconstitutionally restricts the right to direct appeal guaranteed by
article V, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.67 The Grant
rule also violates the due process and the equal protection
provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution by depriving
defendants with short sentences of any procedure to challenge the
effectiveness of trial counsel, while providing review to defendants
with sentences of longer duration.
68
A. The Grant Rule Violates Article V, Section 10 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution by Unreasonably Restricting the Right
to Direct Appeal Guaranteed by Article V, Section 9 of the
Constitution
Article V, section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution
grants the Supreme Court authority "to prescribe general rules
governing practice, procedure and conduct of all courts" and
provides that laws inconsistent with the court's rulemaking
authority "shall be suspended., 69 Section 10(c) limits the court's
rulemaking authority by requiring that court rules must be
"consistent with this Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge nor
modify the substantive rights of any litigant."70 The court's
66 O'Berg, 880 A.2d at 599 (majority opinion).
67 See PA. CONST. art. V, § 9.
68 See infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
69 PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c). The judiciary's rulemaking authority prior to
the 1968 constitution came from the legislature. Act of June 21, 1937, No. 392,
1937 Pa. Laws 1982, 1982-83, amended by the Act of March 30, 1939, No. 13,
1939 Pa. Laws 14, 14 and the Act of August 25, 1959, No. 264, sec. 1, 1959 Pa.
Laws 751, 751. The grant of exclusive rulemaking power, originally codified as
67 PA. STAT. ANN. § 61, was repealed by Section 2 of the Judiciary Act
Repealer Act, No. 1978-53, 1978 Pa. Laws 202.
7 PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(C).
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rulemaking authority under the constitution 71 encompasses both
the formal promulgation of rules of practice and procedure,72 and
rules such as Grant that are articulated in the context of deciding
individual cases.73
Since the adoption of article V of the constitution in 1968, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has resisted "any invasion ...
great or small 74 by the legislature of its rulemaking authority by
suspending numerous procedural laws on grounds that they
intruded upon the court's exclusive rule making authority under
article V, section 10(c). 75 Less litigated 76 is the issue of whether a
71 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has described its rulemaking
authority as rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers and that its power to
establish rules of procedure for state courts is exclusive. In re 42 Pa. C.S. § 1703,
394 A.2d 444, 451 (Pa. 1978) (rejecting the notion that the General Assembly
exercises concurrent rule-making authority and holding that the judiciary alone
has power over rule making); see also Commonwealth v. Morris, 771 A.2d 721,
737 (Pa. 2001) (threshold determination under article V, section 10 is whether a
particular law is "procedural or substantive in nature, given that we have
exclusive rulemaking authority only over procedural law"); Commonwealth v.
Wharton, 435 A.2d 158, 162 (Pa. 1981) (opinion in support of affirmance) ("By
vesting exclusive, constitutional power in the Supreme Court to govern practice
and procedure in the courts of the Commonwealth, the Constitution seeks to
assure that the judicial system will be uniformly and efficiently administered.").
72 See Preface to PA. R. Civ. P. (West 2002).
73 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009)
(requiring that an Anders brief include discussion of counsel's reasons why
client's appeal is frivolous); Commonwealth v. Castillo, 888 A.2d 775, 780 (Pa.
2005) (affirming bright-line rule that any issue not raised in a statement under
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) is deemed waived);
Commonwealth v. Baird, 975 A.2d 1113, 1119 (Pa. 2002) (notice to defense
counsel constitutes reasonable notice for the purpose of determining a
defendant's unavailability under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 600);
Commonwealth v. Chambers, 599 A.2d 630, 644 (Pa. 1991) (per se rule
prohibiting references to religious precepts during argument in the penalty phase
of a capital case).
74 Commonwealth v. Sutley, 378 A.2d 780, 783 n.5 (Pa. 1977) (quoting De
Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18, 21 (1850)).
75 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842, 848 (Pa. 2008)
(holding title 42, section 4136(a)(3)(i) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes
unconstitutional because it grants a procedural right to a jury trial in indirect
criminal contempt cases); Payne v. Dep't of Corr., 871 A.2d 795, 804 (Pa. 2005)
(holding the statute that allows for automatic dissolution of injunction is
procedural); In re Suspension of the Capital Unitary Review Act, 722 A.2d 676,
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court rule violates section 10(c)'s requirement that rules be
"'consistent with [the Pennsylvania] Constitution and neither
abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any
litigant .... , ,7 This question has been considered by the court in
only two cases, both involving the same rule. In Laudenberger v.
Port Authority of Allegheny County,78 the court considered the
constitutionality of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 238
680 (Pa. 1999) (holding that the statute establishing detailed procedure to
administer capital cases conflicts with pre-existing procedures promulgated by
the court); Wharton, 435 A.2d at 160 (opinion in support of affirmance) (finding
that in enacting title 42, section 5104(c) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated
Statutes, which contravenes a rule of criminal procedure, the legislature
impermissibly intruded upon the court's exclusive rulemaking authority); In re
42 Pa. C.S. § 1703, 394 A.2d 444, 450 (Pa. 1978) (Open Meeting law as applied
to judiciary was inconsistent with court's exclusive rulemaking authority). But
see Morris, 771 A.2d at 738 (holding that title 42, section 9545(c) of the
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, governing authority of court to issue stay of
execution, is substantive and not procedural because is it "merely defines the
appropriate circumstances for securing" the right to a stay of execution).
76 In some of the matters involving legislation suspended by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania as violating its exclusive rulemaking power, the court
acted outside the adversarial process by writing to legislators or issuing a
judicial order sua sponte. See In re Pa. C.S. § 1703, 394 A.2d at 445-46; In re
Suspension of the Capital Unitary Review Act, 722 A.2d at 676-77.
7' Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty., 436 A.2d 147, 149 (Pa.
1981) (quoting PA. CONST. art. I, § 10). In dissenting opinions in two cases,
Justice Saylor questioned whether a rule of procedure violated a right conferred
by the Pennsylvania Constitution. Castillo, 888 A.2d at 781 (Saylor, J.,
dissenting); Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597, 607 (Pa. 2005) (Saylor, J.,
dissenting). Although the constitutionality of Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925(b) was not directly at issue in Castillo, in dissenting from the
court's decision affirming the bright-line rule that any issue not raised in a
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) statement is waived on direct
appeal, Justice Saylor noted that strict application of the rule resulted in
"displacement of appeals" and therefore was in "substantial tension with the
right to direct appellate review" guaranteed by the article V, section 9 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. Castillo, 888 A.2d at 781 (Saylor, J., dissenting). In
his dissent in O'Berg, Justice Saylor noted that the Grant rule unduly
"curtail[ed] . . .the availability of appellate review . . .imping[ing] upon the
right of direct appeal guaranteed under the Pennsylvania Constitution." O'Berg,
880 A.2d at 607.
78 Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty., 436 A.2d 147 (Pa.
1981).
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(Rule 238) 79 that provided compensation to a plaintiff in a tort case
for delay in receiving damages. 80 The rule was challenged as
exceeding the court's rulemaking authority and argued on due
process and equal protection grounds. 81 Noting that the rule
contributed to the "orderly and efficient administration of justice,"
the court concluded that the rule was a valid exercise of its
rulemaking authority. 82 The court acknowledged that the rule did
involve the substantive rights of litigants but held that it should not
be prevented from resolving procedural questions "merely because
of a collateral effect on a substantive right." 83 In dissent, Justice
Roberts argued that the rule exceeded the court's rulemaking
authority because it both enlarged and abridged rights in violation
of article V, section 10(c) and "im4Pose[d] arbitrary, unreasonable,
and unequal burdens" on litigants.
8
Five years later in Craig v. Magee Memorial Rehabilitation
Center,85 the court adopted the reasoning of Justice Roberts in his
Laudenberger dissent and suspended the mandatory provisions of
Rule 238.86 The court held the mandatory provisions of the rule
constituted a "substantive enlargement of duties owed" in violation
of article V, section 10(c) and operated as an irrebuttable
presumption that violated the due process rights of defendants. 87 In
his concurring opinion in Craig, Justice Hutchinson noted that a
"salutary" purpose underlying a rule cannot "override [the]
basic ... restraints" that the constitution imposes on the court's rule
making power.
88
79 PA. R. Civ. P. 238. Rule 238 was subsequently suspended in Craig v.
Magee Mem'lRehab. Ctr., 515 A.2d 1350, 1353 (Pa. 1986).
80 Under Rule 238, damages for delay were awarded where the defendant
failed to make a settlement offer or where the offer prior to trial was twenty-five
percent less than what the jury awarded the plaintiff. Laudenberger, 436 A.2d at
151.
" Id. at 149.
82Id. at 155.
83 Id. The court also rejected state and federal due process and equal
protection challenges to the rule. Id. at 156-57.
84 Id. at 160 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
85 Craig v. Magee Mem'l Rehab. Ctr., 515 A.2d 1350 (Pa. 1986).
86Id. at 1352-53.
"7Id. at 1353.881Id. at 1355.
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Like the procedural rule at issue in Craig, the Grant rule was
adopted for the salutary purpose of providing a defendant "the best
avenue to affect his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. ',89 But also
like the rule in Craig, the Grant rule exceeds the court's
rulemaking authority because it unreasonably "abridge[s] . . . the
substantive right[]" 90  of every defendant to direct appeal
guaranteed by article V, section 9 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.91
The right to "one appellate review of a criminal conviction"
92
is available to all defendants in Pennsylvania without regard to the
seriousness of the offense or the length of the sentence imposed.
93
Direct appeal provides a defendant an opportunity "to demonstrate
that the conviction . . . is unlawful. 9 4 Like most jurisdictions,
Pennsylvania permits an appeal to continue if the defendant
completes his sentence during the pendency of the appeal if the
89 Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 738 (Pa. 2002).
90 PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c).
9' PA. CONST. art. V, § 9 provides:
There shall be a right of appeal in all cases to a court of record
from a court not of record; and there shall also be a right of appeal
from a court of record or from an administrative agency to a court of
record or to an appellate court, the selection of such court to be as
provided by law; and there shall be such other rights of appeal as may
be provided by law.
Id. Prior to the 1968 constitution, there was no absolute right to appeal in all
civil and criminal cases. ROBERT E. WOODSIDE, PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 423 (1985). With the exception of a constitutional right
to appeal homicide convictions to the Supreme Court and a limited right to
appeal from a court not of record, appeals were regulated by statute. See id. at
423-24.
92 Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 595 A.2d 1254, 1257 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991);
see also Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 1232, 1237 (Pa. 2001) (Nigro, J.,
concurring) (discussing counsel's failure to protect the right to direct appeal and
noting that "a defendant should be entitled to, at a bare minimum, one appellate
review").
93 Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 416 A.2d 477, 479 (Pa. 1980) ("[A]n
accused has an absolute right to appeal . . . ."); Commonwealth v. Perry, 346
A.2d 554, 555 (Pa. 1975) (requiring counsel to protect the defendant's right to
appeal even in circumstances where counsel believes the appeal is frivolous).
94 Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985).
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defendant will "suffer detriment due to the decision of the trial
court."
9 5
The right to appeal96 in Pennsylvania is a "substantive right. 9 7
As such, judicial limitations on the right to appeal "must be
95 Erie Ins. Exch. v. Claypoole, 673 A.2d 348, 353 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996);
see also Janet D. v. Carros, 362 A.2d 1060, 1070 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (noting
the holding in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968), that "a criminal case
is moot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal
consequences will be imposed").
96 For a discussion of the right to appeal in Pennsylvania, see Leonard
Sosnov, Criminal Procedure Rights Under the Pennsylvania Constitution:
Examining the Present and Exploring the Future, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 217,
329-40 (1993). Sosnov argues that the debates on the right to appeal at the
Constitutional Convention of 1968 demonstrate that "the Framers intended to
provide a fundamental right of review on the merits to every litigant." Id. at 332.
A proposal that would have required "cause shown" for an appeal was defeated
along with an amendment that would have continued permitting appeals to be
determined by the legislature. See J. of Pa. Const. Convention of 1967-1968,
vol. II, 44-1, Feb. 15, 1968, at 870-72; J. of Pa. Const. Convention of 1967-
1968, vol. I, 46-1, Feb. 19, 1968, at 957-58; J. of Pa. Const. Convention of
1967-1968, vol. II, 47-1, Feb. 20, 1968, at 1001.
97 Official Court Reporters of the Court of Common Pleas of Phila. Cnty.
v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 467 A.2d 311, 316 n.lI (Pa. 1983); Stout v.
Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 421 A.2d 1047, 1049 (Pa. 1980). Like
Pennsylvania, nine of the other ten states that guarantee the right to appeal by
constitution have explicitly recognized the right to appeal as a substantive and
not procedural right. See State v. Birmington, 392 P.2d 775, 776 (Ariz. 1964);
Reed v. Hopper, 219 S.E.2d 409, 412-13 (Ga. 1975); Owen Cnty. v. Ind. Dep't
of Workplace Dev., 861 N.E.2d 1282, 1288 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Foremost
Ins. Co. v. Shepard, 588 S.W.2d 468, 469 (Ky. 1979); Smith v. Love, 683 P.2d
37, 38 (N.M. 1984); Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 359 N.E.2d 702, 703
(Ohio 1977); Spitznas v. State, 648 P.2d 1271, 1275 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982);
State v. Lara, 124 P.3d 243, 247 (Utah 2005); Washington v. Blank, 930 P.2d
1213, 1224 (Wash. 1997). Likewise, where the right to appeal is guaranteed by
statute or court rule, the overwhelming majority of states recognize the right to
appeal as a substantive right. See Coffman v. State, 172 P.3d 804, 809 (Alaska
Ct. App. 2007); State v. Kelley, 588 So.2d 595, 597 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991);
In re John Doe, 74 P.3d 998, 1001 (Haw. 2003); Hatfield v. Hatfield, 646 P.2d
481, 483 (Kan. 1982); Smith v. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 416 So.2d 94, 97
(La. 1982); State v. Connery, 661 P.2d 1298, 1300 (Nev. 1983); State v. Howe,
247 N.W.2d 647, 652 (N.D. 1976); Commonwealth v. Rafferty, 402 S.E.2d 17,
19 (Va. 1991).
[Vol. 2013
22] CLOSING DIRECT APPEAL TO INEFFECTIVENESS CLAIMS 705
reasonable"98 in order not to violate the "restraints" article V,
section 10(c) places on the judiciary. 99 By closing direct appeal to
ineffectiveness claims in favor of collateral review of such claims,
the Grant rule unreasonably restricts the right to direct appeal
because it leaves defendants with sentences of short duration
without an appellate or collateral remedy to protect their right to
effective counsel. Simply put, the judiciary cannot, consistent with
the Pennsylvania Constitution, deprive defendants with short
sentences of their constitutional right to appeall °° when no
alternative procedure for review of ineffectiveness claims is
available. Unless and until the legislature amends the PCRA by
removing the custody requirement from the Act,' 0' the Supreme
98 Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638, 642 (Pa. 1998) (relying on
Sayres v. Commonwealth, 88 Pa. 291, 309 (1879), and holding one-year time
limitation in the Post Conviction Relief Act did not unreasonably limit or restrict
defendant's right to habeas corpus under the Pennsylvania Constitution). In
Sayres, the court upheld the constitutionality of a statute that required
defendants to seek a writ of error in the Supreme Court within twenty days of
sentence:
The Constitution then, having given a writ of error with or
without cause, in a certain class of criminal cases, as a writ of right,
has the legislature the power to control and regulate it? It is conceded
that the right may not be denied, nor may its exercise be unreasonably
obstructed or interfered with. But may not the legislature fix return-
days, and provide for a speedy hearing? This court has already done
so, by virtue of its inherent power to control its business, and we have
no doubt our action was in entire harmony with the Constitution. If
the time of returning the writ, or the hearing upon it, may be limited
by rule of court or Act of Assembly, why may not the time be limited
during which the writ may issue of course, provided such limitation
be reasonable?
Sayres, 88 Pa. 291 at 307; see also Commonwealth v. Morris, 771 A.2d 721,
732 (Pa. 2001) (holding the statute governing stays of execution (PCRA) as "not
unreasonably interfer[ing] with appellee's right of appeal"); Commonwealth v.
McFarlin, 587 A.2d 732, 736 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (upholding discretionary
sentencing appeals as a reasonable restriction upon right of appeal).
99 Craig v. Magee Mem'l Rehab. Ctr., 515 A.2d 1350, 1355 (Pa. 1986).
100 Commonwealth v. Maloy, 264 A.2d 697, 698 (Pa. 1970) ("It is now
settled beyond argument that every person convicted of crime has the right to
have his conviction and sentence reviewed through appeal .... "); Morris, 771
A.2d at 732 n.10.
101 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543(a)(1) (2011). Under the Post Conviction
Hearing Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9541-9551 (repealed), which preceded the
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Court of Pennsylvania must recognize a short sentence exception
to the Grant rule permitting ineffectiveness claims in short
sentence cases to be presented and decided on direct appeal.l°2
B. The Grant Rule Violates the Right to Equal Protection and Due
Process Guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution
Under the Grant rule, a post-conviction proceeding is the
only procedure available to defendants to challenge the
effectiveness of trial counsel. 10 3 By refusing to recognize an
exception to Grant that would permit defendants with short
sentences appellate review of ineffectiveness claims, Grant
violates equal protection and due process guaranteed by the
current post-conviction statute, the custody requirement had been interpreted
broadly by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to allow persons who had
completed their sentences to seek post-conviction relief if the criminal
conviction or sentence could affect any subsequent prosecution or conviction, or
if one could show actual or potential civil consequences because of the
conviction. See Commonwealth v. Doria, 364 A.2d 322, 323, 326 (Pa. 1976);
Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 285 A.2d 465, 466, 469 (Pa. 1971), superseded by
statute, Act of Apr. 13, 1988, No. 1988-47, 1988 Pa. Laws 336, as recognized in
Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 718 (Pa. 1997). After the enactment of the
PCRA, the Superior Court in Pierce held that the PCRA "preclude[d] relief for
those whose sentences have expired, regardless of the collateral consequences."
Commonwealth v. Pierce, 579 A.2d 963, 966 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). The issue
was addressed by the legislature in its 1997 amendments to the PCRA, and as
amended, section 9542 states that the Act does not "provide relief from
collateral consequences of a criminal conviction." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9542
(2011).
102 The Superior Court addressed the problem of ineffectiveness claims in
the context of short sentences in Moore. Commonwealth v. Moore, 978 A.2d
988, 989-90 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009). In Moore, the court recognized the inability
of defendants convicted of criminal contempt for violating a protection from
abuse order to raise an ineffectiveness claim in a PCRA proceeding. Id. at 992-
93. The Superior Court noted that because a defendant convicted of such an
offense can be sentenced to no more than six months imprisonment, a PCRA
petition alleging ineffectiveness of counsel will likely be dismissed because the
sentence will have been completed prior to the resolution of a PCRA
proceeding. Id. In order to provide such a defendant a forum to litigate the
ineffectiveness claim, the court held that the protection from abuse court should
conduct a post-sentence evidentiary hearing if an ineffectiveness claim is
alleged, thereby creating a record that would permit appellate review of the
issue. Id. at 993.
' Id. at 992.
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Pennsylvania Constitution by arbitrarily leaving such defendants
without a remedy "to vindicate their right to effective trial
counsel."1
04
While the Pennsylvania Constitution does not contain an
equal protection clause, a number of provisions of the
constitution10 5 have been construed to guarantee equal treatment.
10 6
In recent cases, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has referred
solely to article I, section 1107 of the Pennsylvania Constitution as
Pennsylvania's counterpart to the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. l08 Equal protection claims under the
Pennsylvania Constitution are analyzed under the same standards
used by the Supreme Court of the United States when reviewing
equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment,
104 See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 378 (1986).
105 At various times, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has identified
article I, sections 1, 17, 26, and 28 and article III, section 32 as guaranteeing
equality under the law. See Commonwealth v. Parker White Metal Co., 515
A.2d 1358, 1362-63 (Pa. 1986) (noting that both article I, section 26 and article
III, section 32 contain equal protection guarantees); Love v. Borough of
Stroudsburg, 597 A.2d 1137, 1139 (Pa. 1991) (referring to both article I,
sections 1 and 26 as the equal protection provisions of the Pennsylvania
Constitution). For a discussion of the equality provisions of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, see KEN GORMLEY ET AL., THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION: A
TREATISE ON RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES, § 31.2 (George T. Bisel, ed. 2004). See also
Russell Gerney, Equal Protection Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, 42
DuQ. L. REV. 455, 458-60 (2004) (discussing article III, section 32 as the last
reference addressing equal protection in the state constitution).
106 PA. CONST. art. I, § 26, entitled "No discrimination by Commonwealth
and its political subdivisions" provides: "Neither the Commonwealth nor any
political subdivision thereof shall deny to any person the enjoyment of any civil
right, nor discriminate against any person in the exercise of any civil right."
107 PA. CONST. art. I, § I entitled "Inherent rights of mankind" provides:
"All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and
indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and
liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of
pursuing their own happiness."
108 See, e.g., Kramer v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 883 A.2d 518, 531
n.12, 532 (Pa. 2005) (noting article I, section 26 "safeguards the right not to
be ... punished for the exercise of a constitutional right"); see also Probst v.
Commonwealth, 849 A.2d 1135, 1142 n.12 (Pa. 2004) (discussing an equal
protection claim).
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including the three different standards of review dependent upon
the classification in question.
0 9
The Pennsylvania Constitution also guarantees a defendant the
right to due process of law.' 10 Like the equality provision of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
interpreted the due process guarantee in article I, section 9 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution as providing the same protections as the
Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution.'
The argument that it is unconstitutional to deprive defendants
who receive sentences of short duration of a forum to challenge the
effectiveness of trial counsel rests primarily upon the principles of
fairness and equal treatment that govern direct appeal. 12  The
Federal Constitution does not require states to establish either
appellate courts 113 or collateral review. 1 4 However, once a state
109 Kramer, 883 A.2d at 532; Probst, 849 A.2d at 1143; see also Love, 597
A.2d at 1141 (applying the substantial relationship test).110 PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9. Article I, section 9 provides in pertinent part that
an accused cannot be deprived "of his life, liberty or property, unless by the
judgment of his peers or the law of the land." Id. The "law of the land" language
of the provision has been consistently interpreted by courts to mean due process
of the law. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jackson, 319 A.2d 161, 163 (Pa. 1974)
(applying the constitutional requirement of reciprocal notice in alibi defense
cases); Commonwealth v. Jester, 100 A. 993, 994 (Pa. 1917) (applying the due
process guarantee of being able to present a defense as a state constitutional
requirement); Commonwealth v. Martin, 727 A.2d 1136, 1141 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1999) ("The terms 'due process of law' and 'law of the land' are legal
equivalents."). For a comprehensive discussion of article 1, section 9, see
GORMLEY, supra note 105, at §§ 12.7[a]-12.7[d].
1 Commonwealth v. Haag, 809 A.2d 271, 283 n.13 (Pa. 2002) (article I,
section 9 is the functional equivalent of federal due process); see also
Commonwealth v. Louden, 803 A.2d 1181, 1184 (Pa. 2002) (noting that the
Pennsylvania Constitution does not provide more protection for due process than
its "federal counterpart"); Commonwealth v. Kratsas, 764 A.2d 20, 27 (Pa.
2001) (stating that the federal and state constitutions both "embody the principle
of fundamental fairness"); Commonwealth v. Synder, 713 A.2d 596, 600 (Pa.
1998) (equating the state constitution's "law of the land" language with the
reference to "due proces" in the Federal Constitution).
12 In ML.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996), the Court noted that
decisions concerning access to judicial processes "reflect both equal protection
and due process concerns." See also Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608-09
(1974) (noting the role of both equal protection and due process in resolving
issues of access to direct appeal).
113 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
708 [Vol. 2013
22] CLOSING DIRECT APPEAL TO INEFFECTIVENESS CLAIMS 709
creates a system of post-trial review as part of determining the
guilt or innocence of a defendant, the procedures used by the state
"must comport with the demands of the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Constitution."'1 15 Specifically, due
process requires that the appeal process "offer [to] each defendant
a fair opportunity to obtain an adjudication on the merits of his
appeal."'1 6 A state violates equal protection if it denies a class of
defendants "an adequate opportunity"' 17 to present their claims to
the appellate court.' 18
Grant denies defendants with short sentences their "due
process guarantee of fundamental fairness" by denying them an
opportunity to obtain an adjudication of their ineffectiveness
claims. 19 An essential guarantee of due process is the "opportunity
to be heard."' 120 It is fundamentally unfair to move ineffectiveness
114 Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-57 (1987) (noting that the
Due Process Clause does not require states to appoint indigent defendants
counsel in state post-conviction proceedings as "[s]tates have no obligation to
provide this avenue of relief').
115 Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985). The Court further noted,
"The right to appeal would be unique among state actions if it could be
withdrawn without consideration of applicable due process norms." Id. at 400-
01.
6d. at 405.
117 Moffitt, 417 U.S. at 616.
118 Numerous constitutional protections attach to direct appeal. As an
example, states must provide indigent appellants a transcript of the trial to make
certain that the appeal is "adequate and effective." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12, 20 (1956); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J, 519 U.S. 102, 128 (1996) (finding a
state requirement that conditioned appeal in termination of parental rights cases
on indigent parents' ability to pay record preparation fees unconstitutional);
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 193-95 (1971) (extending Griffin to an
indigent appellant convicted of an ordinance violation punishable by fine only).
States must also provide indigent appellants with counsel to ensure that the "one
and only appeal" as of right is meaningful. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,
357 (1963); see also Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 619 (2005) (noting
unfairness of denying counsel to indigent defendants seeking first-tier
discretionary appellate review of guilty or nolo contendre pleas). Constitutional
safeguards also include the right to effective representation on appeal and fair
procedures governing withdrawal by counsel. See Evitts, 469 U.S. at 396;
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
119 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985).
120 Commonwealth v. Thompson, 281 A.2d 856, 858 (Pa. 1971); see also
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) ("The fundamental requirement
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claims from direct appeal 12 1 to an alternate process that is arguably
better suited to resolve such claims but is closed to a significant
portion of defendants.1 22 "Due process cannot be abolished to
achieve judicial efficiency and convenience. 1 23 By leaving
defendants with short sentences no procedure 124 to present their
ineffectiveness of counsel claims, Grant violates the basic due
process obligation to provide "each defendant a fair opportunity to
obtain an adjudication on the merits"'125 of his or her claim. 126
Denying defendants with short sentences any opportunity to
raise ineffectiveness claims also violates the equal protection
principle that a system of reviewing convictions be "free of
unreasoned distinctions."'' 27 Because Pennsylvania has created a
system to review criminal convictions, it cannot provide review to
some defendants and "entirely cut off' others from any form of
review solely on the basis of the length of the prison sentence
of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.' ") (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 553
(1965)).
121 "The right to appeal would be unique among state actions if it could be
withdrawn without consideration of applicable due process norms." Evitts, 469
U.S. at 400-01.
122 See supra note 19 (showing the numbers of criminal convictions that
would likely not be eligible for a PCRA claim due to the shortness of the
sentence).
123 Boyle v. O'Bannon, 458 A.2d 183, 186 (Pa. 1983).
124 The fact that defendants in Pennsylvania with short sentences have no
forum to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims conflicts with the
understanding of the Supreme Court of the United States that a state defendant
"has ample opportunity to obtain constitutional review" of claims of
ineffectiveness of counsel. Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 383 (2001).
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia indicated that the "fundamental fairness
inherent in 'due process' " suggests that states have an obligation to provide a
forum for defendants to litigate ineffectiveness of trial counsel claims. Id. at
386-87 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 298-99
(1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that due process requires that a
defendant receive "a full and fair" review of federal constitutional claims on
direct or collateral review).
125 Evitts, 469 U.S. at 405.
126 Commonwealth v. Davis, 586 A.2d 914, 917 (Pa. 1991) ("Whenever the
liberty of an individual ... is at risk, fundamental due process is essential.").
127 Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966).
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imposed.128 Because all defendants sentenced to incarceration have
a right to effective counsel at trial, it is an "unreasoned
distinction[]" 129 for Pennsylvania to deny defendants who serve
their sentence during direct appeal or before the collateral process
is complete a review of claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel,
while providing review of such claims for those receiving
marginally longer sentences.
130
III. SEEKING REVIEW OF INEFFECTIVENESS CLAIMS WHEN A SHORT
SENTENCE IS IMPOSED
Because defendants with short sentences have a constitutional
right to a forum to present their claims of trial counsel
ineffectiveness, 13 1 until a short-sentence exception to Grant is
recognized or the PCRA is amended, defendants with short
sentences who obtain new counsel after conviction should raise the
ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal, notwithstanding Grant. If,
as is usually the case, the defendant is represented on appeal by
trial counsel, and, as a result, the issue of ineffectiveness is not
raised on appeal and the defendant is no longer in custody, the
ineffectiveness claim should be presented to the trial court by
petition for writ of coram nobis.
132
128 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974).
129 Rinaldi, 384 U.S. at 310.
30 In re Christy, 67 A.2d 85, 87 (Pa. 1949) ("[D]ue process of law and
equal protection of the laws are secured if the laws operate on all alike, and do
not subject the individual to an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.")
(quoting Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382 (1894)).
131 Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597, 606 (Pa. 2005); see also
Commonwealth v. Musi, 404 A.2d 378, 380 (Pa. 1979) (discussing the
difference, or lack thereof, of presenting an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim on direct apeal or as a collateral appeal).
132 United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 911 (2009) (describing coram
nobis as an ancient common law remedy that in its modem form can redress
constitutional violations "to achieve justice" and be used where alternative




Because appointment of counsel in Pennsylvania is "effective
until final judgment, including any proceedings upon direct
appeal,"' 133 it is unlikely that an ineffectiveness claim will be raised
on direct appeal 134 unless new counsel is appointed following
conviction. Only new counsel can advise the defendant as to
whether there is a basis for claiming prior counsel was ineffective.
If so, new counsel should raise the issue of trial counsel
ineffectiveness by post-trial motion, which will result in a record
and opinion by the trial court that will be available to the Superior
Court. Even if new counsel is appointed after the time allowed for
the filing of post-trial motions, counsel should nonetheless present
the ineffectiveness claim to the Superior Court and argue that,
because of the short sentence imposed, the court should remand the
claim to the trial court instead of deferring it to the post-conviction
process. 135 If the claim is nonetheless deferred and post-conviction
relief is unavailable because the defendant has completed his
sentence, the defendant should seek review of the Grant decision
by petition for allowance of appeal in the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, followed by a petition for writ of coram nobis in the
trial court.
133 PA. R. CRIM. P. 122(B)(2).
131 Commonwealth v. Saranchak, 866 A.2d 292, 299 n.9 (Pa. 2005)
("Under Pennsylvania law, trial counsel cannot be expected to raise his own
ineffectiveness on direct appeal . . . ."); Commonwealth v. Green, 709 A.2d 382,
384 (Pa. 1998) (stating that a public defender may not argue the ineffectiveness
of another member of the same public defender's office because appellate
counsel would then essentially be asserting a claim of her or her own
ineffectiveness).
135 As Justice Saylor noted in his dissent in O'Berg, the practice prior to
Grant was for the appellate court to remand a claim of ineffectiveness if a record
was required to resolve the claim. O'Berg, 880 A.2d at 606 (Saylor, J.,
dissenting); see, e.g., Musi, 404 A.2d at 380 n.4 ("Where one seeks to raise a
claim of ineffective assistance on direct appeal and an enhanced record is
required to support the claim, the proper procedure is to request a remand for an
evidentiary hearing.").
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B. Coram Nobis Review
Prior to Pennsylvania's adoption of a statutory system for
collateral relief, post-conviction relief was limited to the common
law remedies of habeas corpus and, to a lesser extent, coram
nobis.136 While coram nobis was originally restricted to challenges
based on facts not previously before the court, the writ was
expanded by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to correct errors
of law. 137 Coram nobis relief can be sought when "no statute
provide[s] a remedy"' 38 or "where no other form of judicial relief
exist[ed]"' 139 and the defendant was unable to seek earlier relief. 140
136 Commonwealth v. Myers, 213 A.2d 613, 619-20 (Pa. 1965) (explaining
the limited use of coram nobis in light of the expanded reliance upon habeas
corpus but noting the growing use of the common writs as "not surprising or
unwarranted in view of our continuing efforts to provide a full hearing for
claims of federal constitutional violations"); see also John V. Diggins, Coram
Nobis in Pennsylvania, 33 TEMPLE L. Q. 1, 2 (1959) (noting a long history of the
use of the writ in Pennsylvania).
137 In Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 285 A.2d 465, 468 (Pa. 1971), the court
expanded coram nobis based upon the reasoning of the Supreme Court of the
United States in United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512 (1954). Morgan
reasoned that "courts should act by whatever procedural channels appear
necessary to do justice when the record makes plain a right to relief."
Commonwealth v. Fiore, 665 A.2d 1185, 1191 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). In
Morgan, the defendant who had completed his sentence sought coram nobis
relief alleging that he had been denied his right to counsel. Morgan, 346 U.S. at
511. Finding that the record was silent on the issue of whether counsel was
waived, the Court permitted the case to proceed finding no other remedy being
available and noting that while coram nobis was originally limited to correct
errors of fact, its use has expanded to address fundamental constitutional error.
Id. at 511-12; see also Denedo, 556 U.S. at 911 (noting that "in its modem
iteration coram nobis is broader than its common-law predecessor").
138 See Diggins, supra note 136, at 6; see also Commonwealth v. Morris,
771 A.2d 721, 739 (Pa. 2001); Commonwealth v. Doria, 364 A.2d 322, 325 (Pa.
1976) (discussing the role of coram nobis).
139 Commonwealth v. Valerino, 32 Pa. D. & C. 363, 364 (Phila. Q.S.
1938); see also Commonwealth v. Kurus, 92 A.2d 196, 198 (Pa. 1952)
(declining to grant coram nobis relief because claim that the trial court restricted
cross-examination of witness was reviewable on direct appeal); Diggins, supra
note 136, at 2 (describing the purpose of the coram nobis relief).
140 Commonwealth v. Harris, 41 A.2d 688, 689, 691 (Pa. 1945); see also
Sheehan, 285 A.2d at 468 (writ available where defendant had "sound
reasons... for failure to seek appropriate earlier relief' (quoting Morgan, 346
U.S. at 512)).
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Unlike habeas corpus, 14 1 coram nobis relief is not restricted to
defendants in custody. 142
Even after the enactment of Pennsylvania's first post-
conviction relief statute, the Post Conviction Hearing Act
(PCHA), 143 Pennsylvania courts continued to grant coram nobis
relief While the PCHA encompassed the common law remedies,
including coram nobis, and required defendants to be in custody as
a condition for relief, the Act was interpreted as continuing to
permit coram nobis relief if the claim was presented "in
circumstances not covered by the . . .Act.' 44 As a result, a
defendant who completed his sentence could obtain relief by writ
of coram nobis if he "suffered collateral consequences as the result
of a wrongful criminal conviction."
145
The PCRA, which replaced the PCHA, likewise encompassed
"all other common law and statutory remedies ... including habeas
corpus and coram nobis."'146 But unlike the PCHA, the PCRA has
been interpreted as precluding the use of the common law remedies
"if the underlying substantive claim is one that could potentially be
remedied under the PCRA."' 147 In fact, the court has broadened the
14' 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6503(a) (2011).
142 Sheehan, 285 A.2d at 468; see also DONALD E. WILKES, JR., STATE
POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF HANDBOOK § 2.4 (2012) (discussing
the history of post-conviction coram nobis relief).
143 Post Conviction Hearing Act, 1965-554, 1965 Pa. Laws 1580, repealed
and recodified in 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9541-9551 (2011); see Elizabeth L.
Green, Note, Habeas Corpus and the 1966 Post Conviction Hearing Act: Major
Pennsylvania Remedies in Criminal Cases, 39 TEMP. L.Q. 188, 188 (1966)
(citing the "recently enacted" PCHA).
144 Sheehan, 285 A.2d at 467.
145 Commonwealth v. Doria, 364 A.2d 322, 325-26 (Pa. 1976) (noting that
the Sheehan court had concluded that writ of coram nobis "should be made
available to correct errors for which the statutes in force provided no remedy").
146 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9542 (2007) (emphasis added).
141 Commonwealth v. Pagan, 864 A.2d 1231, 1233 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004);
see also Commonwealth v. Eller, 807 A.2d 838, 842 (Pa. 2002) (noting the court
had consistently recognized "the exclusivity of the PCRA in the arena in which
it operates"); Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. 2001) (noting
that the plain language of the Act demonstrates the legislature's intent that
claims that could be brought under the PCRA must be brought under that Act);
Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 718, 721 (Pa. 1997) (stating that the
PCRA "supersedes common law remedies").
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scope of claims to avoid a bifurcated system of collateral review in
which certain claims are considered under the PCRA, while others
are considered pursuant to habeas corpus or coram nobis.148 As a
result, the common law remedies continue to exist only in cases
where "there is no remedy under the PCRA.' ' 149 In addition, the
PCRA has been construed to preclude relief on the basis of
collateral consequences alone' and the Act was amended to
reflect that interpretation. 151
A petition for writ of coram nobis by defendants with
sentences of short duration is consistent with the purpose and
function of the writ. Because ineffectiveness claims cannot be
reviewed on direct appeal as the result of Grant and no statutory1
52
148 Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564, 569 (Pa. 1999) (stating that
the PCRA provides the exclusive remedy where a defendant seeks restoration of
right to direct appeal due to counsel's ineffectiveness); see also Commonwealth
v. Liebel, 825 A.2d 630, 633 (Pa. 2003) (noting that counsel's failure to protect
the right to discretionary appeal cognizable under the PCRA); Commonwealth
ex rel. Dadario v. Goldberg, 773 A.2d 126, 130-31 (Pa. 2001) (noting that the
PCRA and not habeas corpus is the proper remedy where counsel is ineffective
during plea negotiations); Commonwealth v. Chester, 733 A.2d 1242, 1250 (Pa.
1999) (holding errors occurring during penalty phase of a capital case where
cognizable under the PCRA).
149 Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638, 640 (Pa. 1998) (noting that
habeas corpus relief was denied because claims raised by Peterkin, including
ineffective assistance of counsel, were cognizable under the PCRA); see also
Pagan, 864 A.2d at 1233 ("It is only where the PCRA does not encompass a
claim that other collateral procedures are available.").
"0 Ahlborn, 699 A.2d at 721 (noting that "[u]nlike the PCHA ... the
PCRA contains express language which prevents a petition filed under the
PCRA from being treated as a request for relief under the common law"). Prior
to Ahlborn, the Superior Court had "decline[d] to interject the collateral criminal
consequences rule into the PCRA." See Commonwealth v. Hayes, 596 A.2d 195,
199 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding that changes made to the PCRA deliberately
altered the collateral consequences rule); see also Pagan, 864 A.2d at 1233
(noting that while the PCHA allowed for review of claims by coram nobis based
upon collateral consequences, "the PCRA explicitly encompasses these
'collateral consequence' claims"); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 703 A.2d 714, 716
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (noting that the PCRA does not provide relief to those
petitioners whose only sentence is a fine regardless of the collateral
consequences of their sentence).
' Act of June 25, 1997, 1997-33, § 9542, 1997 Pa. Laws 324, 324-25
(codified as amended at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9542 (2011)).
152 See supra notes 8 and 9 and accompanying text.
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or other form of relief exists, 153 the writ provides defendants with
sentences of short duration the only remedy to vindicate their
constitutional right to effective counsel. 54 The fact that the PCRA
has been construed as precluding resort to coram nobis if the claim
could be raised in a PCRA petition is not a valid basis for denying
defendants with short sentences access to the writ where relief is
sought because they have been denied their constitutional right to
present claims of ineffectiveness on direct appeal. Likewise, the
fact that use of coram nobis by defendants with sentences of short
duration will create a bifurcated system of collateral review is
simply the result of the court's decision to reject a short-sentence
exception to the Grant rule. Until such an exception is recognized,
coram nobis is the only procedure available for defendants with
short sentence "to achieve justice."'155
IV. CHALLENGING GRANT IN A CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION
Defendants who have been denied a state remedy to challenge
the effectiveness of trial counsel can seek relief in a federal action
against the individual members of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. Thus, 42 U.S.C. § 1983156 provides a right of action
against parties acting "under color of' state law to redress the
deprivation of rights secured by the United States Constitution or
federal law.' 57 The action would seek a declaration that Grant
deprives defendants with short sentences due process 158 and equal
protection guaranteed by the United States Constitution.159
153 Commonwealth v. Doria, 364 A.2d 322, 325 (Pa. 1976).
154 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 19 Pa. D. & C.5th 129, 129 (Pa. Ct.
Com. P1. Phila. 2010) (granting defendant with a sentence of short duration writ
of error coram nobis on claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel).
155 United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511 (1954).
156 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).157 id.
158 The due process claim would not be barred by Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527 (1981), or Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990). In Parrett, the
Court held that there is not a denial of due process where a random and
unauthorized act of a government official results in a deprivation of property
without due process of law if the state court provides an adequate remedy.
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 542-43 (1981). In Zinermon, the Court held
Parrett applies to deprivations of liberty but does not have application to
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Judges have immunity from liability for judicial or
adjudicatory acts.16 Judicial immunity, however, does not bar
prospective relief against judicial officers. 161 Section 1983
provides that where an "action [is] brought against a judicial
officer for an act ... taken in such officer's judicial capacity," the
action must proceed initially as a request for declaratory relief.'
62
If a declaratory decree is "violated or declaratory relief [is]
unavailable," injunctive relief is specifically authorized against
judicial officers. 163
Such an action would not be barred by the abstention doctrine.
In Younger v. Harris,164 the Supreme Court of the United States
directed district courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction
where resolution of a claim in federal action would interfere with
an ongoing state proceeding, thereby violating principles of comity
and federalism. 165 The Younger doctrine is rooted in the
understanding that a pending state prosecution ordinarily provides
the defendant "a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of
federal constitutional rights."'166 The "pertinent issue" is whether
the constitutional claims presented in the federal action "could
have been raised in the pending state proceedings."' 167 The doctrine
applies only where (1) a state proceeding is pending at the time the
federal action is initiated, (2) "the proceedings implicate important
constitutional claims other than procedural due process. Zinermon v. Burch, 494
U.S. 113, 132-33 (1990). Here, the Grant decision was an official act and no
state remedy is clearly available to defendants with short sentences to challenge
the effectiveness of trial counsel.
159 See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
160 Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988).
161 Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984).
162 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
163 Id.
164 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
165 Id. at 43-44. The policy applies to requests for injunctive and
declaratory relief in criminal and civil matters. Huffman v. Pursue, LTD., 420
U.S. 592, 603-04 (1975); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971).
166 Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975).
167 Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415,425 (1979).
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state interests," and (3) the state proceedings provide an adequate
opportunity to raise federal claims.'
68
The Younger abstention doctrine does not apply to
ineffectiveness claims because neither direct appeal nor the post-
conviction process provides defendants with short sentences the
opportunity to challenge the Grant rule as violating federal
constitutional rights. Where the defendant is represented on appeal
by appointed trial counsel as required by the rules, it is unlikely, as
noted, that trial counsel would identify his own ineffectiveness on
direct appeal, let alone challenge the Grant rule as
unconstitutionally restricting the right to appeal. Moreover, if
federal declaratory relief is sought after direct appeal is completed
and the defendant has already completed his sentence, there would
be no "ongoing state criminal proceeding[]' 169 or other judicial
"avenues" available to the defendant to challenge the Grant rule.170
As such, a federal declaratory action is the only judicial
mechanism available to defendants with short sentences to
challenge the Grant rule and thereby seek to vindicate their federal
constitutional right to effective counsel.
V. CONCLUSION
Sentences of less than a year of imprisonment have increased
significantly each year since the Grant decision. 17 1 The result is
that an even larger group of defendants are left without a remedy to
challenge the ineffectiveness of trial counsel. "[T]he constitution
does not afford some lesser right to effective counsel on those
charged with non-capital crimes."1 72 The constitutional right to
effective counsel is meaningless if defendants are denied a
procedure to enforce the right. Because Grant closes direct appeal
168 Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S.
423, 432 (1982); Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399,
408 (3d Cir. 2005).
169 Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 133 (2004).
170 Id.
171 In 2002 when Grant was decided, there were 3,656 sentences of less
than one year or 5.13% of all sentences. By 2009, 14,491 or 17.43% of all
sentences were for one year or less. See supra note 19.
172 Commonwealth v. Brooks, 839 A.2d 245, 255 (Pa. 2003) (Eakin, J.,
concurring).
718 [Vol. 2013
22] CLOSING DIRECT APPEAL TO INEFFECTIVENESS CLAIMS 719
to ineffectiveness claims in favor of collateral review, which is not
available to defendants who receive a sentence of short duration,'
73
the decision unreasonably restricts the right to direct appeal
guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution. 174 Grant also violates
the due process and equal protection rights of such defendants by
cutting off any opportunity for review of their claims of trial
counsel ineffectiveness while providing post-trial review to
defendants receiving somewhat longer sentences. 175 Because the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has refused to create a short-
sentence exception to Grant that would permit appellate review of
ineffectiveness claims, defendants whose sentences preclude them
from the PCRA process are entitled to review of their
ineffectiveness claims by coram nobis. Finally, defendants who are
unable to obtain review of their ineffectiveness claims by PCRA or
coram nobis should seek a declaratory judgment under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 that the Grant rule unconstitutionally restricts their right
under the Pennsylvania Constitution to direct appeal.
173 See supra Part I.
174 See supra Part II.
175 See supra note 100-02 and accompanying text.
